The Hague Evidence Convention in U.S. Courts:
Aerospatiale and the Path Not Taken, Societ
Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of Iowa,
107 S. Ct. 2542 (1987)
FACTS

Defendants, Socit6 Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale and Soci6t6
de Construction d'Avions de Tourism (Aerospatiale), corporations
wholly owned by the French government, were engaged in the business
of designing, manufacturing, and marketing aircraft.' Plaintiffs, a
United States pilot and a passenger in a plane manufactured by
Aerospatiale which crashed in Iowa on August 19, 1980, sued Aerospatiale in the United States District Court for the Southern District
of Iowa for injuries received in the crash, alleging negligence and
2
breach of warranty.
When Plaintiffs requested documents, interrogatories, and admissions under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Aerospatiale sought
a protective order from the Magistrate preventing this discovery. 3
Aerospatiale contended the requested information was located in a
foreign country (France), and therefore the Hague Evidence
5
Convention 4 provided the exclusive means of obtaining its discovery.
Aerospatiale further contended that French law prevented them from
complying with the discovery request because the request did not
Soci6t6 de Construction d'Avions de Tourism was a wholly-owned subsidiary
of Socit6 Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale. Socit6 Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa, 107 S. Ct.
2542.
1 Id. at 2546.
3 Id.
4

See Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil and Com-

mercial Matters, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No.
7444, 847 U.N.T.S. 231 [hereinafter Hague Evidence Convention]. The treaty entered

into force between the United States and France on October 6, 1974. It is also in
force in Barbados, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, the Federal Republic
of Germany, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Singapore, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. OFFICE OF THE LEGAL ADVISOR, UNITED
STATES DEPT. OF STATE,

TREATIES IN FORCE

Aerospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2546.

261-262 (1986).
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conform with the Convention procedures. 6 The Magistrate concluded
the interests of the United States in ensuring discovery outweighed
the French interests in preventing it, based upon a determination that
compliance would not be greatly intrusive and would not take place
7
in France; accordingly, he denied the petition for a protective order.
On interlocutory appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
affirmed the decision, holding that the Convention has no application
in a United States court when litigants seek the discovery of evidence
in the possession of a foreign party subject to the court's jurisdiction,
even when the evidence is located in a foreign country.' The Court
of Appeals further rejected the contention that international comity
require first resort to the Convention before use of the Federal Rules. 9
The court stated that when a foreign statute prevents compliance with
a discovery order issued under the Federal Rules, a two-step analysis
is required. A court must first determine whether the propriety of a
discovery order regardless of any conflict with the foreign law, and
if the order is proper and the requested party fails to comply, the
court should then determine what sanctions, if any, should be im-

6 Id. at 2546. Article IA of the French Penal Code Law No. 80-358 stipulates
that "[slubject to treaties or international agreements and applicable laws and
regulations, it is prohibited for any party to request, seek or disclose in writing,
orally or otherwise, economic, commercial, industrial, financial or technical documents or information leading to the constitution of evidence with a view to foreign
judicial or administrative proceedings or in connection therewith." C. PR. PEN.,
Law No. 80-358, Article IA. For Convention procedures, see infra notes 12-18 and
accompanying text.
Aerospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2547. The magistrate, however, stated that he would
require compliance with the Convention if oral depositions were to be taken in
France. Id. at n.7.
I In re Socit6 Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale, 782 F.2d 120 (8th Cir. 1986).
9 Id. at 125-26. Comity refers to the practice whereby one country's tribunals
grant deference within that country to laws and other official acts of another country
in the interests of maintaining an amicable and cooperative international system.
"Comity, in the legal sense is neither a matter of absolute obligation on the one
hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will upon the other. But it is the recognition
which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial
acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience,
and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under the protection
of its laws." Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64, (1985).
"[Comity] is not a rule of law, but one of practice, convenience, and expediency.
Although more than mere courtesy and accomodation, comity does not achieve the
focus of an imperative or obligation. Rather, it is a nation's expression of understanding, which demonstrates due regard both to international duty and convenience
and to the rights of persons protected by its own laws." Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 440 (3d Cir. 1971).
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posed. Since the Magistrate answered only the first question, the
Eighth Circuit panel found it premature to consider the second, and
upheld the refusal of a protective order. 0
On appeal, held, affirmed in part, reversed in part; vacated and
remanded for further proceedings. In a United States court proceeding, when litigants seek discovery of foreign evidence from a party
subject to the court's jurisdiction, the Hague Evidence Convention
does not provide the exclusive or mandatory means for this discovery.
Furthermore, there is no requirement that first resort be made to
Convention procedures in all cases before non-Convention discovery
methods may be pursued. Nevertheless, the Convention is not inapplicable in such cases; rather, it is one alternative vehicle for foreign
discovery, along with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and other
relevant United States statutes. Which discovery methods are permissible in a particular case will depend upon the specific circumstances of that case, analyzed in a balancing test of competing interests.
Socikto Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States District
Court for the Southern District of Iowa, 482 U.S.
-, 107 S.Ct.
2542 (1987).
LAW

Subsequent to the entry into force of the Hague Evidence Convention, questions arose as to its application and relationship to the
Federal Rules in American courts, in particular whether there existed
a requirement of exclusive or first use of the Convention procedures
for discovery of foreign evidence. The law in this area consisted
primarily of the Convention itself, the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Revised)," and a series of lower
court decisions. 12

10

In Re Soci6t& Industrielle Aerospatiale, 782 F.2d 120, 127 (8th Cir. 1986).

1

RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (REvISED)

(Tent. Draft No. 7, 1986); see also Draft No. 6, Vol. 1, § 473 (1985).
12 See infra notes 30-40 and accompanying text. For a more extensive list of
cases, see Hague Conference on Private International Law, PracticalHandbook on

the Operationof the Hague Convention of 18 March 1970 on the Taking of Evidence

abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, pt. IV (1984).
The Supreme Court previously considered problems of foreign discovery in a preConvention case, Soci~t6 Internationale Pour Participations Industrielle Et Commercials, S.A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958). In this case, the petitioner, a Swiss
holding company (also known as Interhandel) sought recovery of assets seized by
the United States government in 1941 under the Trading With the Enemy Act. The
Government requested documents from Interhandel under the Federal Rules to
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The Convention provides, with certain restrictions, 3 three primary
methods for the discovery of foreign evidence:' 4 through letters of
request to the foreign authorities, 5 by diplomatic or consular agents
of the requesting State, 6 and by commissioners appointed by the

substantiate the Government's claim that Petitioner was intimately linked with. an
enemy German corporation and therefore not entitled to recover its assets. Interhandel
asserted it's inability to comply with the court-ordered discovery because Swiss law
prevented production of the documents, under threat of imprisonment. Id. at 200.
The U.S. district court dismissed the case because of Interhandel's failure to comply,
accepting the government's allegations as established. Id. at 202.
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that dismissal with prejudice
was unjustified on the facts at that time. The Court emphasized the fact that foreign
law prevented Interhandel from complying with the request. Id. at 211. The Court
pointed out that the foreign law was not a matter within Interhandel's control and
that there existed no showing of bad faith on Interhandel's part in its attempts to
obtain the release of the documents. Id.
This case was not concerned with the specific question of the proper role in
American courts of the Hague Evidence Convention. This decision came before the
Convention was contemplated, and involved the deprivation of property under the
Fifth Admendment, which somewhat narrows the scope of the holding to its particular
facts. Nevertheless, the case can be read generally as requiring at least the consideration by courts of any foreign laws preventing compliance with discovery orders,
as well as the good faith of the party in attempting to produce the evidence, before
extreme sanctions such as dismissal are applied.
1 See infra notes 14-16.
See, Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 4, at arts. 9, 15 & 21. Contracting
States may also permit methods of taking evidence in their territory other than those
provided in the Convention. See id. at arts. 27(c) & 32. Moreover, States may also
modify Convention procedures. Id. at art. 8.
11Chapter I of the Convention provides that a judicial authority of a Contracting
State may, by a Letter of Request, ask the designated Central Authority of another
Contracting State -to "obtain evidence or to perform some other judicial act" in
the latter State for use in judicial proceedings in the former. Hague Evidence
Convention, supra note 4, at art. 1. Requests will be executed under the methods
and procedures of the foreign State, but requests for special methods or procedures
will be followed unless impracticable or inconsistent with the laws of the executing
State. Id. at art. 9.
States may refuse requests only if: (a) the person in possession of the evidence
has a privilege or duty to refuse to disclose it under the laws of the requesting or
requested State, (id. at art. 11); (b) the execution does not fall within the functions
of the judiciary of the requested State, (id. at art. 12); (c) the requested State
considers that execution of the request would prejudice its sovereignty or security
(id.); or (d) a State may declare, at or before its accession, that it will not execute
requests "issued for the purpose of obtaining pre-trial discovery of documents."
(id. at art. 23).
Any necessary compulsion must be applied by the requested State, in the same
instances and to the same extent as for similar orders under its internal laws. Id.
at art. 10.
Under Chapter II of the Convention a diplomatic.or consular officer of a
14

16
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requesting court. 17 Specific problems have arisen when litigants in

American courts have sought discovery of foreign evidence by domestic non-Convention methods which conflicted with procedural or
substantive rules of another State, party to the Convention, where
8
the evidence was located.'
The Restatement (Revised) contains a broad, if partially normative,
description of United States law regarding such conflicts. Countries
have jurisdiction to prescribe 9 their laws with respect to conduct
within their territory or to conduct outside their territory causing
effects within their territory; 0 with respect to their nationals 2' and
with respect to acts directed against State security or interests. They
may not prescribe laws applicable to persons or things connected with
another State when to do so would be unreasonable. 22 Generally, a
State cannot require a person to perform, or refrain from performing,
an act in another country when the act is prohibited, or required,
by the latter country or by the country of which the person is a

Contracting State may, without compulsion, take evidence from nationals of his
State, in the territory of another Contracting State. States may require that permission
be requested from and granted by them before this method is used in their territory.
Id. at art. 15. A diplomatic or consular officer may also take evidence within another
Contracting State from nationals of that other State or of a third State if the officer
receives, and complies with the terms of, permission from the State where the
evidence is to be taken. Id. at art. 16.
17 Chapter II of the Convention allows commissioners appointed by a Contracting
State to take evidence from that State's nationals, without compulsion, in another
Contracting State. The commissioner must also receive, and comply with the terms
of permission of the latter State. Id. at art. 21.
Diplomatic and consular officers of, and commissioners appointed by, a Contracting State (see supra notes 16 and 17) may be refused evidence if the State where
the evidence is located feels that disclosure would be incompatible with that state's
laws. Id. at art. 21.
1' Such conflicts typically stem from the different concepts of discovery, and the
judiciary's role in the process, in civil law and common law countries. The former
generally view discovery as a judicial function to be carried out by the courts.
Consequently, such countries frequently consider discovery by foreigners within their
territory to be an infringement on their sovereignty. See generally, Gerber, Extraterritorial Discovery and the Conflict of Procedural Systems, 34 AM. J. Comp. L.
745 (1986).
19 Section 401 defines '"prescribe": "[for a country] to apply its law to the
activities, relations, status,' or interests of persons, or to things, by legislation,
executive act or order, administrative rule or regulation or judgment of a court."
RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW (REVISED), supra note 11, at § 401 (1986).
- Id. at § 402(1).
21

Id..

22

Id. at § 403(1).
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national. 23 The State can, however, require or prohibit such an act
24
within its own territory.

For discovery specifically, an American court may, when authorized
by a statute or rule, order a person subject to its jurisdiction to
produce evidence "relevant to an action or investigation, even if
located outside the United States." '25 Before issuing such an order,
however, the court should first consider several factors: whether the
evidence originated in the United States; the importance of the evidence to the litigation; the specificity of the request; the extent to
which noncompliance would undermine important United States interests; the extent to which compliance would undermine important
interests of the State where the evidence is located; and the availability
of alternative means of acquiring the evidence. 26 If disclosure is
prohibited by another government, the person in possession of the
evidence may be required to make a good faith effort to secure
27
permission for its disclosure from that government.
Three general positions have been identified 2 in the lower courts
regarding the relationship between Convention procedures and nonConvention domestic procedures for foreign discovery in American
courts. 29 Some courts, from considerations of comity, have required

parties seeking foreign evidence to make at least first resort to Convention procedures.3 0 Others have decided that Convention procedures
are simply an alternative in such cases, to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. 3 The third approach is a determination of the status or
at § 436(1).
Id. at § 436(2).

23 Id.
24

Id. at § 437(1)(a).
Id. at § 437(1)(c).
27 Id. at § 437(2)(a).
28 See Maier, ExtraterritorialDiscovery: Cooperation Coercion and the Hague
Evidence Convention, 19 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 239, 240 (1986).
29 While the exclusivity theory is advocated by some commentators,
such an
25
26

interpretation has not been accepted by the federal courts as a general proposition.
See Heck, U.S. Misinterpretation of the Hague Evidence Convention, 24 COLUM.

J.TRANSNAT'L L. 231 (1986); Gerber, supra note 18, at 780. Convention procedures
have been required, however, for such discovery as depositions to be taken within

the territory of another country. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Fellows Gear Shaper Co.,
102 F.R.D. 956, 958 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
30 See,

e.g., Volkswagenwerk, A.G. v. Superior Court, 109 Cal. Rptr. 219, 221

(1973), holding that depositions in Germany of employees of defendant German

corporation and inspection of defendant's facilities there must be sought in conformity
with channels and procedures established by the foreign country, in this case through
letters rogatory under the Evidence Convention. Id.

11See, e.g., Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 103 F.R.D.
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applicability of the Convention procedures by analyzing the particular
circumstances of each case. For instance, courts have stated that
Convention procedures must be used when particularly intrusive types
of discovery, such as depositions, are sought within the territory of
another country.32 Other courts have found the Convention to have
no applicability to production orders for foreign evidence directed
to parties which are subject to a court's jurisdiction."
The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari for three appellate
cases involving the Convention, including Aerospatiale. In the first
of these, In re Anschuetz & Co., a4 the district court, using the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, ordered a German corporate defendant to
produce in the United States several deponents and various documents
then located in Germany for use in the American court preceedings.
On appeal, the German government argued in an amicus brief that
such depositions would violate German sovereignty unless carried out
through Convention procedures.3 5
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Convention is
not the sole method for foreign discovery in American courts.3 6 The
court stated while the Convention is to be employed for involuntary
depositions of parties conducted in foreign countries, and for discovery from foreign persons not subject to the court's in personam
jurisdiction, the Convention "has no application at all" to the production of evidence in the United States by a foreign party subject

42, 51 (D.D.C. 1984). The court rejected the contention of defendant German airline

that the Evidence Convention provided the exclusive means for obtaining depositions
and documents abroad. Id. Judge Greene concluded that "Congress did not intend
to deprive litigants of their right to a fair trial in the courts of the United States
in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when it ratified the [Evidence]
Convention." Id. at 50. The judge went on to note, "[tihe goal of the Hague
Convention was to facilitate and increase the exchange of information between
nations; it would not serve that goal to transform its provisions into a means to
frustrate the discovery process in United States courts." Id. at 49.
32 See, e.g., McLaughlin, 102 F.R.D. at 956.
13 See, e.g., In re Anschuetz & Co., 754 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1985).
14 In re Anschuetz & Co., 107 S. Ct. 3223 (1987). The Court granted certiorari
and vacated the judgment, remanding the case to the Fifth Circuit for further
consideration in light of Soci6t6 Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States
District Court for the Southern District of Iowa. Id.
11 In re Anschuetz, 754 F.2d at 605. The United States Departments of Justice
and State agreed with the German government in an amicus brief, and stated that
Convention procedures should be used for such discovery unless a comity analysis
suggests otherwise. For a discussion of the United States governments' position on
these issues, see supra note 25 at 248-53.
36 See In re Anschuetz, 754 F.2d at 614.
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to the court's jurisdiction.3 7 The court felt that matters preparatory
to compliance with United States discovery orders (for example,
gathering and organizing requested documents and mailing them to
the United States for production in the United States court), even
when undertaken in a foreign country, do not constitute discovery
in a foreign nation as addressed by the Hague Convention.38
The Supreme Court also granted certiorari to another Fifth Circuit
case, In re Messerschmit Boklow Blohm GmbH.3 9 In this case, the
trial court used the Federal Rules to order the defendant German
corporation to produce in the United States evidence and expert
witnesses located in Germany. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit refused
the defendant's argument for a comity requirement of first use of
the Convention. The court concluded German sovereignty was not
violated because the discovery order required no governmental action
in Germany. A comity balancing of respective interests, therefore,
did not indicate that the Convention should be used rather than
Federal Rules procedures. 4°
DECISION

In Aerospatiale, the Supreme Court addressed the question of
whether a Federal District Court must use Convention procedures to
seek admissions, production of documents, and answers to interrogatories from a French defendant over whom the court has personal
jurisdiction. 4' In its answer, the 5-4 majority, speaking through Justice
Stevens, rejected opinions from opposite ends of the spectrum and
adopted a position under which courts must determine the Convention's applicability by analyzing the circumstances of each case.
The Court began its analysis by rejecting any requirement of exclusive or first resort to the the Convention as inconsistent with the
Convention's language and its negotiating history. 42 The Court noted
that the Convention's Preamble does not speak in mandatory terms;
rather, it declares the purposes of the Convention as facilitating

Id. at 615.
31Id. at 611.
17

39 In re Messerschmitt Boklow Blohm GmbH, 757 F.2d 729 (5th Cir. 1985) cert.
granted, Messerschmitt Boklow Blohm, GmbH. v. Walker, 106 S. Ct. 1633 (1986),
order vacated by Messerschmitt Boklow Blohm, Gmbh v. Mississippi River Bridge
Authority, 107 S. Ct. 3223.
4° Messerschmitt, 757 F.2d at 732-33.
4
Aerospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2546.
42

Id. at 2550.
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discovery and improving cooperation among members. 3 The Court
further stated that the Convention text itself does not require any
State to use Convention procedures or to change its own evidence
gathering procedures." Specifically, the Court emphasized the words
"may" in Articles 1, 15, 16 and 17, which set out the Convention's
discovery procedures. 45 These permissive provisions contrast sharply
with the mandatory terms of the Hague Service Convention, 46 drafted
several years earlier by the same body that produced the Evidence
Convention. 47 The Service Convention conspicuously states its procedures "shall" be used for serving specified judicial documents
abroad;4 8 in contrast, the permissive wording of the Evidence Convention appears to be intentional. Finally, the Court felt the negotiating history of the Evidence Convention forecloses an exclusive
interpretation, and instead suggests the United States sought the
Convention's adoption as a means of facilitating, not restricting
49
foreign discovery.
The Court also rejected a comity-based first resort requirement.
Prior to reaching this conclusion however, the Court dismissed the
Eighth Circuit's contention that courts should actually forego first
use of the Convention to avoid possible affronts to foreign governments. The Eighth Circuit felt that such affronts would result from
orders, under the Federal Rules, for discovery previously refused by

43

Id.

- Aerospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2551.
41 Id.; see supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text. Moreover, Article 23
permits
a Contracting State to refuse to execute Letters of Request for pre-trial discovery,
a daunting prospect were the Convention the sole means for discovery in all cases.

See Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 4, at art. 23.
Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Doc46

uments in Civil or Commercial Matters, Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361, T.I.A.S.
No. 6638, 658 U.N.T.S. 103 [hereinafter Hague Service Convention]. (Entered into
force for the United States Feb. 10, 1969).
41 The drafting body was the Hague Conference on Private
International Law.
See SEN. ExEc. Doc. A, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. v (1972).
Is Hague Service Convention, supra note 46, at arts. 2, 3, 5 & 6.
, Aerospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2549. In particular, the Court emphasized the

statement of Steven Amram, a principal American participant in the negotiations,
as the Convention's purpose: "to establish a system for obtaining evidence located
abroad that would be 'tolerable' to the state executing the request and would produce

evidence 'utilizable' in the requesting state." Id. The Court also noted the U.S.
Secretary of State's report explaining that the promptness of agreement on the

Convention was in large measure due to the participants' desire to eliminate the
difficulties encountered by courts and lawyers in obtaining foreign evidence. Id.
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the foreign government when requested under the Convention. ° The
Supreme Court nevertheless refused to declare a general rule of law
requiring first resort to Convention procedures in all cases. After
questioning whether it had the "lawmaking" power to declare such
a rule, 5' the Court decided that it would be unwise to do so in any
event, since Convention procedures might in some cases be unduly
time consuming and expensive, and less certain to produce the needed
evidence than the Federal Rules. 52 Unpersuaded by the contention
that a first use requirement served as a necessary protection to the
sovereignty of foreign countries, the Court refused to fashion a general
rule based upon comity considerations. In so deciding, the Court
stated that comity requires a more particularized analysis of the
respective interests of the foreign nation and the requesting nation
than could be achieved under a general generic rule fashioned by the
Court. Furthermore, the Court set forth as relevent considerations
in any comity-based determination the factors listed in Section 437
53
of the Restatement.
While refusing to adopt a mandatory interpretation, the Court also
rejected the Court of Appeals' contention that the Convention simply
"does not apply" to foreign discovery from a litigant subject to a
court's jurisdiction.5 4 The Court noted that the text of the Convention
makes no distinction between parties which are subject to a court's
jurisdiction and those which are not. Moreover, it found no textual
support for the contention that evidence is not "abroad," and therefore excluded from the Convention's scope, if the evidence is in the
possesion of a party subject to a United States court's jurisdiction.5
In sum, the Court held that the Convention procedures are "optional"
for foreign discovery in and by American courts, serving as one
method a court may employ to facilitate such discovery. The efficacy
and necessity of requiring the use of these procedures depends upon
the facts and sovereign interests involved in a particular case, and
the likelihood that resort to the procedures will prove effective.5 6
'0 The Court of Appeals stated that an American courts' order ultimately requiring
discovery that a foreign court had already refused under Convention procedures
would be "the greatest insult" to the sovereignty of that tribunal, greater than a
failure to use the Convention at all. In re Aerospatiale, 782 F.2d at 125-26.
5, Aerospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2555.
52

Id.

11See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
14 In re Aerospatiale, 782 F.2d at 124.
5 Aerospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2554.
516Id. at 2555-56.
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COMMENT

In Aerospatiale, the Supreme Court in effect adopted the approach
of Section 437(1) of the Foreign Relations Restatement 57 to determine
permissible methods of foreign discovery in each case. While a court
should consider the sovereign interests of the countries involved,
through the comity factors listed in that section, it may order discovery
by whatever methods it deems appropriate and likely to be productive.
The Supreme Court commendably refused to render the Convention
either omnipotent or irrelevant; nevertheless, the majority missed an
opportunity to avoid these extremes and at the same time interpret
the Convention broadly enough to better protect the interests and
expectations of the other states party to the Convention.
The majority is correct in refusing an exclusive interpretation. Such
an interpretation is clearly contradicted by the text and negotiations.
It has been argued that because American courts already permitted
liberal discovery, the other States Party would be denied a quid pro
quo for further opening their systems to foreign discovery unless the
procedures formalized and agreed to in the Convention served as the
sole methods for such discovery.5" This argument is unconvincing,
for any such dramatic limitation on the Federal Rules would undoubtedly have been explicitly stated in the treaty text. Moreover,
each State Party also gained this same access to the systems of other
parties in addition to that of the United States.5 9
An interpretation requiring first resort to the Convention procedures
in all cases is suspect for these same reasons. Additionally, either an
exclusive or a first use requirement would make the discovery process
needlessly rigid, eliminating along with the other discovery methods
a measure of flexibility which is essential in effectively responding
to the diverse facts and divergent interests often present in transnational litigation. Although the other States parties cannot reasonably forward an exclusive interpretation, it is nevertheless unlikely
that they engaged in the lengthy negotiations and agreed to formalize
the substantial procedures of the Convention in the expectation that
these procedures would be merely one "option" for American litigants
to use for discovery in their territories. While a major impetus behind
the Convention was the desire to facilitate the transnational flow of

5' See RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW (REVISED), supra note 11,

§ 437(1).

58 See, e.g., Heck, supra note 29.

19 See Maier, supra note 28, at 260.

at
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information, the parties were equally eager, according to a principal
American participant, "to establish [discovery mechanisms] that would
be 'tolerable' to the State executing the request, ' 60 (i.e. in whose
territory the evidence is located); the Convention was meant to provide
"a bridge between civil law and common law practices." '6' The best
evidence of what would be tolerable to the various parties is the
mechanisms which they agreed to in the Convention. The United
States courts should, where at all possible, give effect to the provisions
agreed upon by all the States parties and thereby protect their expectations and interests.
While rejecting a first use requirement, the Supreme Court bypassed
a less rigid alternative and unnecessarily diminished the Convention's
stature in American courts: a requirement of first consideration of
the Convention for foreign discovery. This alternative, proposed by
the dissent 62 and some commentators, 63 would preserve the availability
of the Federal Rules in appropriate cases, and at the same time more
effectively assuage the concerns of other parties about unbridled
foreign discovery expeditions. The first consideration requirement
would consist of "a general presumption that, in most cases, courts
should resort first to the Convention procedures [for foreign discovery].'6' This presumption could be overcome, and the Federal Rules
used, only if the circumstances of the particular case strongly indicated
that the Convention procedures would be unproductive. Such a presumption would in effect be the equivalent of a first use requirement
with an exception for situations in which the Convention mechanisms
appeared clearly unlikely to produce the needed evidence.
A first consideration requirement would more effectively incorporate foreign expectations. In a case where resort to the Federal
Rules is necessary, the non-use of the Convention would arguably
not frustrate foreign expectations since the Convention (as a condition
precedent to the use of the Federal Rules) would not have facilitated
effective discovery, thereby failing to serve one of its two main
purposes.
- Amram, Explanatory Report on the Convention on the Taking of Evidence
Abroad in Civil or Commerical Matters, in S. ExEc. REp. No. 25, 92nd Cong., 2d
Sess. 11 (1972), quoted in Aerospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2549.
61 Amram,
United States Ratification of the Hague Convention on the Taking
of Evidence Abroad, 67 AM. J.

INT'L

L. 104, 105 (1973).

Aerospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2558. Justice Blackmun wrote the dissenting opinion,
joined by Brennan, Marshall, and O'Connor.
63 See,. e.g. Maier, supra note 28, at 262-64.
64Aerospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 258.
62
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Another benefit of a general presumption in favor of Convetion
procedures is that such a presumption would obviate the need for
an expenditure of judicial resources in every case on a complex and
problematic balancing of United States and foreign sovereign interests.
It has been argued that the courts are a particularly inappropriate
forum, both practically and constitutionally, for the amorphous political analysis necessary in such a balancing.65 The majority approach
66
requires "scrutiny in each case of . . . sovereign interests."
Such a scrutiny would not be necessary in each case under the
first consideration approach. The basic inquiry here would be whether
the Convention procedures appeared clearly unlikely to produce the
requested evidence. This may be suggested by, for example, a foreign
blocking statute unequivocally prohibiting release of the evidence. In
such a case, for the reasons discussed above, the Convention does
not provide the exclusive means of discovery. At this point the court
may, to the extent possible, balance interests. If the United States
interests appear predominant, the court could, and should, order the
production of the evidence and issue any appropriate sanctions for
non-compliance under the Federal Rules. The Convention would be
justifiably circumvented because it failed to meet one of its primary
goals. More importantly, a first consideration requirement would
avoid a balancing of sovereign interests in all of the more numerous
cases which do not involve a showdown of conflicting fundamental
sovereign interests. As the dissent in Aerospatiale noted in regard to
the additional expenses which may be incurred through Convention
procedures, "[clertainly discovery controlled by litigants under the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is not known for placing a high
' 67
premium on either speed or cost-effectiveness.
It is possible that American courts, using the approach of the
Aerospatiale majority, will effectively balance interests and avoid
unnecessary affronts to foreign governments by using Convention
procedures when appropriate. Surely an involuntary deposition abroad
must in all cases be sought first through the Convention. 68 It is
unlikely, however, that every situation will be so clear-cut. Furthermore, there appears to be a sound basis for the concern that pro-

65

See, e.g., Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909,,

948-50 (D.C. Cir. 1984); see also Aerospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2559-60.
66 Aerospatiale, 107 S. Ct. at 2556.
67 Id.
at 2565.
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vinciality and a pro-forum bias will frequently infect the balancing
69
process by American courts.
The origins of the controversy over the proper role of the Convention in United States courts lie within the executive branch as well
as within the lack of clarity in the Convention. itself. Perhaps the United
States and the European States Parties failed to realize the true extent
70
of each others' interests and concerns in formulating the Convention.
Given the amount of controversy at the time of the negotiations,
however, a more likely possibility is that the various parties, unable
to bridge their differences completely, finally signed an agreement
setting forth their common ground and circumventing other areas,
such as the Convention's relationship to the Federal Rules.
While the judiciary bears no blame for the uncertainty, it is the
judiciary which nevertheless must deal with the daily problems of
transational litigation. To the extent that Aerospatiale represents a
triumph for the Federal Rules, it may be a pyrrhic victory in the
long-run. Judicial insensitivity by United States courts has caused
hostility abroad 7' which may lead to unnecessary obstacles for efficient
international litigation in United States courts, as well as problems
for American litigants in foreign tribunals. Such concerns should not
coerce American courts to forego their considerable powers under
the Federal Rules to enforce United States laws when the exercise of
such powers is appropriate. These concerns do, however, suggest the
necessity of an approach which will protect United States laws and
policies, while at the same time causing the least possible offense to
foreign sensibilites. The dissent's first consideration requirement is
such an approach.
Roger C. Wilson
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